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CLIPPED WINGS: DOMESTIC DRONE SURVEILLANCE AND 
THE LIMITS OF DUE PROCESS PROTECTION 
Benjamin White* 
“‘[I]n the application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be 
only of what has been, but of what may be.’ The progress of science in 
furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop 
with wire tapping.” 
– Justice Brandeis, Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) 
(concurring) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, six cows wandered onto the property of a North Dakota 
farmer, Rodney Brossart.1 The owner of the cows went to retrieve them. 
He told Brossart that the cows belonged to him, but Brossart told him 
that they were his cows now. An argument broke out and the police 
arrived to the scene. Brossart threatened the police, saying, “If you go 
on my land, you won’t walk off.”2 Brossart and his three sons were 
wielding firearms. After a 16-hour standoff, the police called a 
neighboring Air Force base, which dispatched a large fixed-wing 
unmanned aircraft vehicle (“UAV” or “drone”) called a Predator, which 
is armed with cameras and sometimes weapons. Soon Brossart was in 
police custody.3 
Rodney Brossart and his sons were the first known people arrested 
with the aid of a drone.4 Though his encounter with a drone was 
occasioned by his own criminal behavior, important constitutional 
questions were at play in the government’s use of drones and their 
abilities for aerial surveillance. The public debate hinges on issues of 
privacy, liberty, security, and control. Although many states have passed 
some legislation concerning drones,5 the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s latest rules governing drones left many privacy 
questions unanswered. Congress has yet to pass significant regulations 
 
* Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review. Thank you to my faithful 
supporter, Mandy. 
 1. Joe Wolverton, II, First Man Arrested By Aid of Drone Convicted in North Dakota, THE 
NEW AMERICAN (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/17534-first-
man-arrested-by-aid-of-drone-convicted-in-north-dakota. 
 2. State v. Brossart, 858 N.W.2d 275, 282 (N.D. 2015). 
 3. Wolverton, supra note 1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. AMANDA ESSEX, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TAKING OFF: STATE 
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS POLICIES 21 (2016). 
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on government use of drones, and the courts have seen very few cases 
involving drones. The inchoate state of drone law requires a close look 
at what sort of judicial protections are likely, in lieu of unified federal 
regulation. 
Drones “threaten to perfect the art of surveillance.”6 Unlike covert 
government surveillance across networks, such as the work of the 
National Security Agency (“NSA”), government “surveillance of the 
populace with drones would be visible and highly salient. People would 
feel observed,” even if the information gathered was never used.7 
Observation from the sky elevates surveillant activity above the lateral 
plane where our images are captured on security cameras and where we 
use our computers, lifting the government’s presence into three 
dimensions.8 
II. BACKGROUND 
Congress has dedicated significant energy to debating the issues 
attendant to drones and privacy.9 Drones represent unique issues, not 
just in aviation technology, but in privacy, surveillance, Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence,10 and Due Process jurisprudence. 
Surveillance is a sensitive subject for many groups, including minorities 
whose relationships with government figures are frequently already 
fraught.11 The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has released 
rules governing certain drones; these rules, however, have no 
application on government-operated drones, and the public is 
increasingly concerned about the risk to their privacy with slow or 
inadequate legislative responses.12 
 
 6. M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 30 (2011). 
 7. Id. at 33 (emphasis original). 
 8. See Bertrand Guay, Ohio Town Wants to Implement Massive Aerial Surveillance Program, 
RT (Apr. 5, 2013, 9:45 PM), https://www.rt.com/usa/program-city-surveillance-dayton-412/ (“Drones 
aren’t conducting surveillance 24/7 in the United States just yet, but that doesn’t mean there’s nothing to 
worry about: in Dayton, Ohio, manned airplanes might soon do the spying.”). 
 9. See, e.g., The Future of Drones in America: Law Enforcement and Privacy Considerations: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of Sen. Chuck 
Grassley, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) [hereinafter Future of Drones]. 
 10. Drones’ impact on the Fourth Amendment has been debated at length. See, e.g., Y. Douglas 
Yang, Big Brother’s Grown Wings: The Domestic Proliferation of Drone Surveillance and the Law’s 
Response, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 343 (2014). 
 11. See Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move From Above, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (August 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-secret-
surveillance/. 
 12. EPIC v. FAA: Challenging the FAA’s Failure to Establish Drone Privacy Rules, 
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, https://epic.org/privacy/litigation/apa/faa/drones/ (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2017) (reporting that a privacy group has sued the FAA for failing “to issue and solicit 
public comments on proposed drone privacy regulations.”). 
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A. The Privacy Risk 
1. Dynamics at Play in the Notion and Practice of Surveillance 
George Orwell’s 1949 novel, 1984, satirizes the authoritarian state, 
where speech and movement are subject to constant surveillance by 
anonymous, remote government actors.13 The expression “Orwellian” 
has come to invoke, among other anxieties, governmental actions 
designed to infiltrate private life.14 Edward Snowden’s revelations of the 
NSA’s data collection practices confirm Orwell’s suspicion that the 
government will appropriate technological advances to monitor society 
at the macro and micro levels.15 Julian Assange, of WikiLeaks fame, 
describes the “omniscient marvels of today’s surveillance state” as so 
advanced to make Orwell’s visions seem “quaint, even reassuring.”16  
But not all surveillance is unpopular. After Tamerlan and Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev detonated bombs at the Boston Marathon that killed three 
people and wounded 264,17 they were quickly identified through 
security footage that helped lead to their capture within five days.18 
Surveillance can lead to other societal benefits as well: closed-circuit 
television (“CCTV”) and surveillance cameras have demonstrated the 
potential to reduce crime.19 For instance, Baltimore’s investments in 
 
 13. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949). In the story, at least two forms of surveillance have become 
anchored as cultural norms. In the first chapter, the protagonist notices a low-flying helicopter among 
the buildings: it was the police, “snooping into people’s windows.” Id. at 2. Second, and more 
predominant, are the ubiquitous telescreens that record audio and visual information with great 
sensitivity – at one point, the protagonist notes that “you could not control the beating of your heart, and 
the telescreen was quite delicate enough to pick it up.” Id. at 79. 
 14. See, e.g., Orwellian, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, 
http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/orwellian (last visited July 9, 2017); Ian 
Croch, So Are We Living in 1984?, The New Yorker (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/so-are-we-living-in-1984; Sam Jordison, Do You Really 
Know What ‘Orwellian’ Means?, The Guardian (Nov. 11, 2014, 7:01 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2014/nov/11/reading-group-orwellian-1984. 
 15. See Ewen MacAskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-
revelations-decoded# 
section/1.  
 16. Julian Assange, Who Should Own the Internet?, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/opinion/julian-assange-on-living-in-a-surveillance-society.html.  
 17. Boston Marathon Terror Attack Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/ 
us/boston-marathon-terror-attack-fast-facts/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2017, 5:10 PM).  
 18. Id.; Kate Dailey, The Rise of CCTV Surveillance in the US, BBC (Apr. 29, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
magazine-22274770. 
 19. Nancy G. La Vigne, et al., Community Oriented Policing Services, Evaluating the Use of 
Public Surveillance Cameras for Crime Control and Prevention vii (2011) [hereinafter Public 
Surveillance Cameras]. 
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cameras in high-crime urban areas, despite costs in installation, 
maintenance, and monitoring, have paid off. Four months after 
implementation, total crime within the cameras’ viewsheds had 
decreased by almost 25%.20  
The introduction of public surveillance systems does not always tout 
such impressive numbers, and even the statistics above poorly represent 
other dynamics contributing to the change in crime. After similar 
surveillant interventions in Washington, D.C., crime was still sporadic. 
Statistical analysis did not clearly reveal that the cameras had produced 
a positive impact.21 Challenges imperiling the success of surveillance 
differ between active and passive monitoring. “Passive” monitoring 
finds application in investigations and prosecutions, because no one 
watches the images as they are captured. Instead, investigators retrieve 
and examine previously recorded footage as the need arises.22 However, 
zooming in after the footage has already been recorded renders granular 
images, which do not often lead to positive identifications.23 “Active” 
systems are viewed in real time, usually by police or security guards.24 
This occupies their time and keeps them from other duties. Since the 
demands of active monitoring exceed the resources of most 
jurisdictions, passive and active systems are often used together.25 These 
limitations can be difficult to navigate. 
Solutions to the practical limitations described above, however, do 
not address the privacy concerns which many find most troubling. A 
significant fear is that the people who work with the gathered 
information may misuse it.26 “Mission creep” describes the phenomenon 
of “government officials misusing data in bad faith or for ends they 
believed were justified, albeit not explicitly authorized.”27 This concern 
 
 20. Id. The underlying theory of why public surveillance can deter crime is consistent with the 
rational choice theory, which assumes that individuals weigh the risks and rewards before deciding to 
offend. If they know they are being watched, the risk increases for the same reward. In theory, this 
dynamic should reduce criminal offenses. The COPS findings indicate that this theory has merit. Id. at 4. 
 21. Id. at 73-85.  
 22. Id. at 3 and 85, 
 23. Id. at 85.  
 24. Id. at 3. 
 25. Id. at 4. Even science fiction writer Isaac Asimov pointed out the flaw in 1984 that Orwell’s 
telescreens are far too inefficient to surveil the populace. “One person cannot watch more than one 
person in full concentration, and can only do so for a comparatively short time before attention begins to 
wander. I should guess, in short, that there may have to be five watchers for every person watched. And 
then, of course, the watchers must themselves be watched since no one in the Orwellian world is 
suspicion-free.” Isaac Asimov, Review of 1984, http://georgeorwell.org/asi.htm, (last visited FEB. 1, 
2017). 
 26. PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS, supra note 19, at 5. This concern includes an argument 
for adequate safeguards and regulations upon the government officials to prevent the misuse of 
information.  
 27. Christopher Slobogin, Surveillance and the Constitution, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1105, 1128 
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can be further exacerbated when the government hires outside 
contractors to perform its intelligence work. Outside contracting entrusts 
matters of critical security to private parties, who may be less 
accountable to oversight.28 
A common rejoinder to privacy advocates is that people with nothing 
to hide have nothing to fear.29 One writer has observed that proponents 
of this argument’s simplest iteration can be confronted merely by asking 
whether they have curtains at home.30 A stronger form of this argument 
maintains that all law-abiding citizens have nothing to hide and “people 
engaged in illegal conduct have no legitimate claim to maintaining the 
privacy of such activities.”31 Arguably the strongest variant of the 
nothing-to-hide argument is that the transaction involves a small amount 
of private, but negligible, information about ourselves in exchange for 
information that could potentially increase national security.32 What 
becomes clear is that the security concerns and the privacy concerns 
need to be balanced.33  
 
The value of privacy, the argument provides, is low, because the 
information is often not particularly sensitive. The ones with the 
most to worry about are the ones engaged in illegal conduct, and 
the value of protecting their privacy is low to nonexistent. On the 
government interest side of the balance, security has a very high 
value. Having a computer analyze the phone numbers one dials is 
not likely to expose deep dark secrets or embarrassing information 
to the world. The machine will simply move on, oblivious to any 
patterns that are not deemed suspicious. In other words, if you are 
not doing anything wrong, you have nothing to hide and nothing to 
fear.34 
 
 
(2009). 
 28. Richard Willing, Defense Dept. Pays $1B to Outside Analysts, USA TODAY (Aug. 29, 2007, 
9:54 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-08-29-dia_N.htm (reporting that the 
DOD had contracted with private intelligence professionals, albeit with supervision by government 
employees). 
 29. Daniel J. Solove, ‘I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 747 (2007). 
 30. Id. at 749. This rhetorical question serves to show that everyone holds something in private. 
 31. Id. at 751. 
 32. Id. at 752-53. 
 33. One data security expert has suggested that conceiving the dichotomy as privacy pitted 
against security mischaracterizes the issue when the tension is actually between liberty and control. 
Bruce Schneier, The Eternal Value of Privacy, WIRED NEWS (May 18, 2006, 2:00 AM), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20061130065347/http://www.wired. 
com/news/columns/1%2C70886-0.html.  
 34. Solove, supra note 29, at 753. 
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In balancing these interests, Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. 
United States is a helpful treatise on privacy.35 Noting that the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments were designed to protect “the sanctities of a 
man’s home and the privacies of life,”36 Justice Brandeis observed that  
 
‘time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and 
purposes.’ Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading 
privacy have become available to the government. Discovery and 
invention have made it possible for the government, by means far 
more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in 
court of what is whispered in the closet.37 
 
Expositing the constitutional safeguards provided by the Framers, he 
drew attention to the Constitution’s recognition that “only a part of the 
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material 
things.”38 Against the government, the Framers installed “the right to be 
let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued 
by civilized men.”39 
 Besides Justice Brandeis’s strong endorsement of respecting private 
spheres, philosophical and psychological works recognize the effects 
surveillance has on people. Michel Foucault developed Jeremy 
Bentham’s concept of the Panopticon: a circular, segmented carceral 
structure where the observer, occupying a central tower in the midst of a 
network of cells, can maintain a constant, alert gaze on every subject 
contained within them.40 Each subject occupies a fixed place and “is 
constantly located.”41 This physical manifestation of surveillant power, 
however, does not capture today’s nuanced system of surveillance 
“assemblages” – the sophisticated network of informational flows 
 
 35. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928). 
 36. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 
(1886)). 
 37. Id. Justice Brandeis goes on to say that “‘in the application of a Constitution, our 
contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be.’ The progress of science in 
furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire tapping.” Id. at 474. 
 38. Id. at 478. This passage echoes words Justice Brandeis helped pen almost four decades 
earlier in a famous publication with the Harvard Law Review. “The intense intellectual and emotional 
life, and the heightening of sensations which came with the advance of civilization, made it clear to men 
that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things.” Samuel D. Warren & 
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890). 
 39. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478. 
 40. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH 195-97 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d 
ed. 1995) (1977). 
 41. Id. Foucault’s Panopticon is largely about the exercise of power: “the slightest movements 
are supervised . . . all events are recorded . . . an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and 
periphery . . . power is exercised without division . . . .” Id. at 197. 
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constantly sourced by diverse outputs such as social media (through 
which an individual helps develop her own “surveillance record”42) and 
any other channel through which information is conveyed.43 In other 
words, modern surveillance is bulwarked by the social imperative to 
belong to a community, even a digital one.44 The digitization of 
community thus expands surveillance systems into our social 
networks.45 
The United Kingdom has been criticized for its rapid expansion of 
CCTV surveillance,46 and Americans can look to the United Kingdom to 
observe how mass surveillance affects individuals, given the ubiquity of 
surveillance systems.47 But we can also refer to our own history. J. 
Edgar Hoover’s counter-intelligence program, COINTELPRO was 
designed to neutralize certain participants in the political process, 
particularly minority voices like those of the Black Panthers and Martin 
Luther King, Jr. COINTELPRO offers a vivid glimpse at what 
government agencies can accomplish with the knowledge of individuals’ 
personal information.48 Hoover pried past private barriers the old-
fashioned way, but new tools are available today. 
2. Drones’ Unique Threat to Privacy 
Drones feature advanced technological capabilities such as facial, 
license plate, and biometric recognition.49 Yet drones are also 
 
 42. Jennifer Golbeck, All Eyes On You, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Sept. 2, 2014), 
https://www.psychologytoday. 
com/articles/201409/all-eyes-you.  
 43. Darren Ellis et al., The Affective Atmospheres of Surveillance, 23 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 
716, 717 (2013). 
 44. See id. at 723. 
 45. See id. This dynamic does not mean that people knowingly develop their surveillance 
records. Selective curation of the selves we decide to present to the world is a salient feature of social 
media, but when people with whom we have not decided to share our personal information nevertheless 
have access to it, a sense of self and ability to influence the impressions people have on us is in 
jeopardy. See Golbeck, supra note 42 (“Most of us try to curate the public identities we broadcast—not 
only through the way we dress and speak in public, but also in how we portray ourselves on social 
medial platforms.”). See also Jason G. Goldman, How Being Watched Changes You – Without You 
Knowing, BBC (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20140209-being-watched-why-thats-
good (“If there is one thing that the rise of social media has taught us it's how to carefully curate the 
information we present to the digital world.”). 
 46. David Murakami Wood & C. William R. Webster, Living in Surveillance Societies: The 
Normalisation of Surveillance in Europe and the Threat of Britain’s Bad Example, 5 JOURNAL OF 
CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN RESEARCH 259, 259 (2009). 
 47. Ellis et al., supra note 43, at 716 (noting that cities are particularly concentrated zones of 
surveillance).  
 48. COINTELPRO, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/hueypnewton/actions/actions_cointelpro.html (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2017). 
 49. Future of Drones, supra note 9, at 3. 
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controversial “because of their potential use by overreaching 
governments.”50 Many commentators express anxiety that current and 
imminent applications of drones by the government will deteriorate “our 
dwindling individual and collective privacy.”51 A salient feature of 
drones is that they are equipped with cameras.52 They are designed with 
remote observation in mind. The operator can see what the drone sees 
by feeding the drone’s camera footage either to virtual reality (VR) 
goggles or a screen mounted to the remote control. The operator flies the 
drone using this visual feedback or by maintaining a visual line of sight 
(VLOS) on the craft.53 Drones are autonomous.54 They can “fly, hover, 
or navigate without input from a pilot.”55 Their ability to self-stabilize 
without constant control by a pilot is part of what makes them 
intelligent.56 Many drones also have multiple rotors, which are a 
physical explanation for their autonomy as well.57 Extra propellers 
generate increased lift, enabling them to carry more powerful cameras.58 
Those cameras are what pose a threat to privacy interests,59 and 
drones of all sizes have them.60 Furthermore, manned aircraft impose 
practical limitations on the government’s surveillance ability, given the 
expense in acquiring, operating, and maintaining them.61 Drones are 
cheaper than manned aircraft.62 “[R]outine aerial surveillance in 
 
 50. Georgeanne A. Wallen, Becoming an Orwellian Society: Big Brother is Watching You, 40 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 65, 69 (2015). 
 51. Calo, supra note 6, at 32.  
 52. See John Patrick Pulen, This Is How Drones Work, TIME (April 3, 2015), 
http://time.com/3769831/this-is-how-drones-work/. 
 53. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 
42,066 (proposed June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107). 
 54. Pulen, supra note 52. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. See id. However, weight also decreases battery life. Consequently, drones are currently 
limited to short flight times, usually not much longer than 12 minutes. Id. 
 59. JAY STANLEY & CATHERINE CRUMP, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PROTECTING 
PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE 
AIRCRAFT 1 (2011) [hereinafter PROTECTING PRIVACY]. 
 60. See id. at 2. 
 61. Id. at 1. 
 62. See, e.g., Romesh Ratnesar, Five Reasons Why Drones Are Here to Stay, 
BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (May 23, 2013, 7:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
05-23/five-reasons-why-drones-are-here-to-stay (reporting that military drones represent about one third 
of all military aircraft, but manned jets consume over 90 percent of air power spending); Scan Eagle, 
U.S. AIR FORCE, https://web.archive.org/web/20130710112005/http://www.af.mil/ 
information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=10468 (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) (reporting that the Insitu 
ScanEagle system, discussed infra, costs $3.2 million for four drones, a catapult, and recovery boom, 
providing over 20 hours per flight of “direct situational awareness” with high-resolution day and night 
cameras and thermal imager).  
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American life” is becoming easier and more reasonable to anticipate, 
without new safeguards designed to protect against government abuses 
of privacy.63  
Drones come in a variety of styles and serve diverse applications. The 
armed forces use the large, fixed-wing Predator and Reaper drones in 
attacks against Al-Qaeda-linked militants in Pakistan.64 They can be 
operated from remote distances, transmitting video feed of ground 
activity to the operators.65 They take off and land like conventional 
airplanes and frequently carry missiles and laser-guided bombs.66 In 
contrast, fixed-wing drones can be smaller, such as Insitu’s ScanEagle, 
which has a 10-foot wingspan and a camera with “full pan, tilt and zoom 
capabilities [that] allows the operator to track both stationary and 
moving targets.”67 A catapult launcher sends it into flight and a 
SkyHook retrieval system—a rope hanging from a 50-foot boom—
captures it in midflight when its mission is complete.68 After the 
Houston police department tested the ScanEagle, inviting law 
enforcement personnel to watch the drone’s performance, the FAA was 
“flooded” with police requests to fly drones on patrol.69  
The most commercially popular drones may be the easily-acquired 
quadcopters that can hover and send video footage to the operator.70 One 
innovator of these drones observed that, as with the personal computer 
and Internet before them, the usage and market of drones are unclear.71 
 
 63. PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 59, at 1. The ACLU reports, “We need a system of rules 
to ensure that we can enjoy the benefits of this technology without bringing us a large step closer to a 
‘surveillance society’ in which our every move is monitored, tracked, recorded, and scrutinized by the 
authorities.” Id. 
 64. Id. at 2 (noting that the Predator has a wingspan of 66 feet and can fly as high as 50,000 
feet); Steve Coll, The Unblinking Stare: The Drone War in Pakistan, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 24, 
2014), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking-stare.  
 65. Coll, supra note 64. 
 66. Drones: What Are They and How Do They Work?, BBC (Jan. 31, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-10713898.  
 67. ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Historical Snapshot), BOEING, 
http://www.boeing.com/history/products/ 
scaneagle-unmanned-aerial-vehicle.page (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) [hereinafter ScanEagle Snapshot].  
 68. Id. 
 69. Stephen Dean, Police Line Up to Use Drones on Patrol After Houston Secret Test, HOUSTON 
EXAMINER (Jan. 11, 2010), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110803064812/http://www.examiner.com/page-one-in-houston/police-
line-up-to-use-drones-on-patrol-after-houston-secret-test; PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 59, at 2. 
 70. See, e.g., Jim Fisher, The Best Drones of 2017, PC MAG (Jan. 23, 2017), 
http://www.pcmag.com/roundup/337251/ 
the-best-drones.  
 71. Adam Tanner, Drone Innovator Sees Future in Gathering Information, Not Package 
Delivery, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2013, 2:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2013/12/03/drone-
innovator-sees-future-in-gathering-information-not-package-delivery/#8bcbbca48518.  
9
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Various applications await to be discovered, but “[s]omething sure will 
come.”72 What is clear is that the technology lends itself to being 
exploited to gather information.73  
Finally, there are the increasingly tiny drones, such as the Black 
Hornet and Nano Hummingbird.74 The Nano Air Vehicle (“NAV”) 
industry illuminates the effort that is going into creating aircraft verging 
on undetectable. The Nano Hummingbird, designed by the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) within the 
Department of Defense (“DOD”), looks like the bird after which it is 
named, flapping its wings to stabilize its flight.75 It exploits a design 
process called biomimicry. It can fly through open doors and windows, 
sit on power lines, blend in with its environment, and gather information 
while camouflaged to look like wildlife.76 One defense expert reported 
that they can be used anywhere, “and the target will never even know 
they’re being watched.”77 The Pentagon has contributed about $4 
million to the Nano Hummingbird’s development and similar 
technology.78 Another NAV, the Black Hornet, has been described as 
“exactly the kind of drone that scares people about drones.”79 It films in 
normal and infrared light, carries regular and thermal cameras, fits in the 
palm of a hand, and can be programmed to fly to waypoints 
autonomously.80 
Some of these drones are designed with military purposes in mind.81 
However, this fact does little to mitigate public concerns about drones 
being used domestically for surveillance and criminal investigation. The 
DOD has the largest drone force, followed by Customs and Border 
Protection (“CBP”).82 From 2010 to 2012, CBP flew almost 700 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. W.J. Hennigan, It’s a Bird! It’s a Spy! It’s Both, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Feb. 17, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2011/feb/17/business/la-fi-hummingbird-drone-20110217; Kelsey D. Atherton, Special Forces Test 
Hummingbird-Size Drone, POPULAR SCIENCE (May 29, 2015), http://www.popsci.com/american-
special-forces-test-hummingbird-sized-drone.  
 75. Theworacle, AeroVironment/DARPA Nano Hummingbird UAV Flying, YOUTUBE (Feb. 17, 
2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8ZbtZqH6Io.  
 76. Hennigan, supra note 74. The developers show an interest in blending into the environment, 
pointing out that hummingbirds are rare in New York City and that a sparrow may therefore be better. 
Id. This comment is illuminating: the targets of biomimetic reconnaissance live in American cities.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Atherton, supra note 74.  
 80. Id.; Patrick Tucker, US Special Forces Are Experimenting with Bug Drones, DEFENSE ONE 
(May 28, 2015), http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/05/us-special-forces-are-experimenting-
bug-drones/113947/. 
 81. See Tucker, supra note 80.  
 82. Craig Whitlock & Craig Timberg, Border-Patrol Drones Being Borrowed by Other Agencies 
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surveillance missions with drones on loan to other federal, state, and 
local agencies.83 At the time, CBP was one of the few agencies that the 
FAA permitted to use drones daily and domestically.84 Such interagency 
drone-sharing practices – the context of Rodney Brossart’s arrest – 
suggest that the purpose a drone is engineered to serve is secondary to 
the government’s interest in deploying them to meet ends that may be at 
odds with the public’s interest.85  
B. Government Response to Drones 
1. The Federal Aviation Administration86 
In 2012 – the same year Rodney Brossart was arrested – Congress 
 
More Often Than Previously Known, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/border-patrol-drones-being-borrowed-by-
other-agencies-more-often-than-previously-known/2014/01/14/5f987af0-7d49-11e3-9556-
4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html?utm_term=.f7ad5b3d0fb2.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. See Michael Peck, Predator Drone Sends North Dakota Man to Jail, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2014, 
7:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/01/27/predator-drone-sends-north-dakota-
man-to-jail/#213036d95853 (reporting on North Dakota farmer, Rodney Brossart, arrested with the 
assistance of a Predator drone, most commonly known as what the Air Force uses in the Middle East).  
 86. The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) falls under the umbrella of the Department of 
Transportation (“DOT”), which belongs to the Executive Branch. Given the diverse applications of 
drones, including wildfire monitoring, scientific research, border protection, and law enforcement 
support, as well as expectations of technological capacity, President Obama ordered Federal agencies to 
examine their policies and procedures vis-à-vis the “collection, use, retention, and dissemination of 
information obtained by UAS, to ensure that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are protected.” 
BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM: PROMOTING ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS WHILE 
SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN DOMESTIC USE OF UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (Feb. 15, 2015). The President identified the Privacy Act as an applicable 
regulation with which agencies must comply, but did not limit agencies’ compliance to that Act alone. 
Id. 
  Agencies were also instructed to update their policies and procedures, or create new ones, as 
such changes become necessary. Id. The collection and use of data acquired by drones must be pursuant 
to an authorized purpose. Id. Agencies may only retain drone-acquired personally identifiable 
information (“PII”) for 180 days, unless longer retention is necessary to an authorized mission, justified 
by the Privacy Act, or required “by any other applicable law or regulation.” Id. Information not 
maintained by a recording system provided for by the Privacy Act “shall not be disseminated outside of 
the agency unless dissemination is required by law, or fulfills an authorized purpose and complies with 
agency requirements.” Id. 
  The President provided for oversight measures by requiring that agencies verify that federal 
personnel and contractors involved in drone programs are guided by rules of conduct and training. 
Additionally, agencies must ensure that procedures exist providing for the report of drone abuses and 
misuses. Id. Any individuals with access to PII must also operate within a regime of policies and 
procedures providing for meaningful oversight. Id. Requests of drone-assistance for governmental 
operations must conform to articulable policies and procedures as well. Id. Finally, any government 
which receives Federal funding for drones must “have in place policies and procedures to safeguard 
individuals’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties prior to expending such funds.” Id. 
11
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passed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act (“Reform Act”).87 
Among its provisions, the Reform Act authorized and required the FAA 
to propose rules governing the use of civil drones in national airspace 
(“NAS”).88 Specifically, Congress instructed the Secretary of 
Transportation to “develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the 
integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace 
system.”89 Pursuant to the Reform Act, the FAA finalized the Rules for 
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“Part 107”) on June 21, 2016, and 
Part 107 went into effect on August 29, 2016.90 
Some important observations need to be made. First, Part 107, by 
statutory definition, only applies to drones that weigh less than 55 
pounds.91 Thus, the executive guidance for which the public has waited, 
and about which it commented widely, has not restricted the use of 
drones larger than 55 pounds. Second, Part 107 is concerned with 
integration of civil unmanned aircraft.92 These two features of the FAA’s 
most recent Rules are related in that the drones most civilians fly weigh 
less than 55 pounds.93 
The second feature – Part 107’s application to civil drones only – 
means that government entities are no more regulated after the passage 
of the Rules than they were before. “Public aircraft” refers to aircraft 
used solely by the United States Government.94 “Civil aircraft” is any 
aircraft that is not a public aircraft.95 Section 332 of the Reform Act 
directed the FAA to promulgate a “comprehensive plan” for the 
integration of civil drones into the NAS within 270 days of the 
enactment of the Act.96 As for public drones, Section 334 directed the 
FAA to “issue guidance” regarding their operation, using the same 270-
day deadline.97  
 
 87. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (2012).  
 88. Id. at § 332(a)(1). 
 89. Id.  
 90. Press Release – DOT and FAA Finalize Rules for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, (June 21, 2016), 
https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=20515.  
 91. § 331(6), 126 Stat. at 72; Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 
81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 42,066 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107). 
 92. See §§ 331-332, 126 Stat. at 72-75. Congress clearly distinguished civil UAS and public 
UAS by providing for the former in § 332 and the latter in § 334. Additionally, § 332(a)(2)(H) makes 
plain the congressional intent for FAA to provide guidance for the safe and simultaneous operation of 
civil and public UAS. 
 93. See Fisher, supra note 70. 
 94. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(41) (2012). This definition is necessarily simplified and subject to an 
exception. If the aircraft is used for commercial purposes, or to carry unqualified non-crewmembers, it 
ceases to be a public aircraft, as defined.  
 95. § 40102(a)(16). 
 96. § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 73. 
 97. § 334, 126 Stat. at 76-77. The difference between the development of a “comprehensive 
12
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Part 107 straightforwardly excludes public drones from its 
applicability: “this rule applies to civil aircraft operations only.”98 The 
FAA had explained in the Notice of Public Rule Making (“NPRM”) that 
Part 107 would not apply to public operation of small drones.99 Public 
aircraft operation – the FAA uses the DOD as an example – is already 
governed by 14 C.F.R. § 91, but this is not specific to drones.100 Instead 
of broadly applicable regulation, the Certificate of Waiver or 
Authorization (“COA”) process controls government use of drones.101 
Responses to the Freedom of Information Act show that a diverse 
variety of government entities have requested COAs from the FAA, 
namely the Air Force, NASA, CBP, DARPA, police departments from 
across the country, and universities.102   
Both NASA and the DOD recommended that the FAA amend the 
Rule “to clarify that [P]art 107 does not apply to aircraft operated by or 
for the National Defense Forces of the United States, but could be used 
as an alternative means of compliance.”103 These comments ultimately 
would have been redundant protective measures in the government’s 
favor, “because § 107.1 expressly limits the applicability of [P]art 107 to 
civil small UAS.”104 Instead, the FAA pointed out that these rules offer 
increased flexibility for government drones, because Part 107 permits 
the government to comply with its provisions in lieu of seeking a COA 
from the FAA.105 
NASA and the DOD were not the only parties that commented on 
Part 107 when it was proposed. During the notice and comment period, 
 
plan” for civil drones and issuing “guidance” for public drones is not made clear. However, what is clear 
is that the FAA has not proposed separate rules on public drones at anywhere near the same level of 
sophistication as it has with civil drones. 
 98. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 
42,079 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.; see also Air Traffic and General Operating Rules, 14 C.F.R. § 91.113. A search of § 91 
reveals nothing pertaining to unmanned aircraft, except for unmanned rockets and balloons. See 14 
C.F.R. § 91.1. 
 101. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,079; 
see also FED. AVIATION ADMIN., CERTIFICATIONS OF WAIVER OR AUTHORIZATION (COA), 
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/ 
headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/aaim/organizations/uas/Coa/ (last visited Feb. 2, 
2017).  
 102. Fed. Aviation Admin., Freedom of Information Act Responses, 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/foia_ 
responses/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) [hereinafter FOIA RESPONSES]. An example of what the COAs 
contain include, in the case of the Air Force, a request to fly Predator drones within the jurisdiction of 
Los Angeles Air Route Traffic Control Center. 
 103. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,079. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  
13
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the public voiced numerous concerns, many of which related to privacy 
from government abuses.106 However, the FAA treated privacy as 
beyond the scope of its rulemaking.107 Part 107 states that the public 
comments “demonstrate a lack of consensus” with respect to how 
integration of drones jeopardizes the privacy interest, how these 
concerns should be addressed, and what role, if any, the FAA has in 
addressing privacy.108 Addressing this purportedly fragmentary record, 
the FAA observed that “its mission is to provide the safest, most 
efficient aerospace system in the world, and does not include regulating 
privacy.”109 The features on drones that provoke concerns about privacy 
relate to technology and hardware, not flight safety.110 The FAA 
identified cameras as lying beyond its administrative reach, and for that 
matter, the protection of individual privacy.111 However, the agency did 
acknowledge that its detachment from the privacy issue was not the end 
of the matter: 
 
[T]here is substantial, ongoing debate among policymakers, 
industry, advocacy groups and members of the public regarding the 
extent to which UAS operations pose novel privacy issues, whether 
those issues are addressed by existing legal frameworks, and the 
means by which privacy risks should be further mitigated. 
Recognizing the importance of addressing privacy concerns in the 
proper forum, the FAA has partnered with other Federal agencies 
with the mandate and expertise to identify, develop, and implement 
appropriate mitigation strategies to address privacy concerns.112 
 
The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the FAA’s regulatory 
authority over the navigable airspace, with the purpose of ensuring 
aircraft safety, efficient use of the airspace, and protection of “persons 
 
 106. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, REGULATIONS.GOV, 
https://www.regulations. 
gov/docket?D=FAA-2015-0150 (last visited Feb. 2, 2017). 
 107. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,190. 
“[P]roposed regulations to address privacy concerns were deemed beyond the scope of this rulemaking . 
. . Although the FAA regulates the safe and efficient operation of all aircraft within the NAS, the FAA 
has never extended its administrative reach to regulate the use of cameras and other sensors extraneous 
to the airworthiness or safe operation of the aircraft in order to protect individual privacy” (emphasis 
added). Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. “[T]he FAA has never extended its administrative reach to regulate the use of cameras 
and other sensors extraneous to the airworthiness or safe operation of the aircraft in order to protect 
individual privacy.” 
 112. Id.  
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and property on the ground.”113 The American Civil Liberties Union has 
identified this latter zone of authority—the protection of individuals on 
the ground—as obliging the FAA  
 
to protect individuals on the ground [by] protecting the privacy that 
Americans have traditionally enjoyed and rightly expect. If the 
agency refuses to do so, or is found by the courts to have limited 
powers in that area, then Congress should step in to directly enact 
any additional protections that are needed to preserve that 
privacy.114 
 
However, the Reform Act made it clear that Congress did not intend 
for the FAA to make sweeping provisions and restrictions on every 
current application of drones.115 Congress also constrained the content of 
the comprehensive plan it directed the FAA to draft by focusing on the 
safe operation of drones in the national airspace system.116 Provisions 
related to privacy are absent.117 The FAA reaffirms its congressionally 
limited role this way:  
 
None of the UAS-related provisions of Public Law 112–95 [the 
Reform Act] directed the FAA to consider privacy issues when 
addressing the integration of small UAS into the airspace, or 
mandated the inclusion of privacy considerations in the UAS 
Comprehensive Plan. Reading such a mandate into Public Law 
112–95 would be a significant expansion beyond the FAA’s long-
standing statutory authority as a safety agency.118 
2. Congressional Attempts to Regulate Government Drones 
Congress has proposed bills drafted to curtail applications of drones 
that would intrude on privacy. The Preserving American Privacy Act of 
2015, proposed in the House of Representatives in March 2015, seeks 
the protection of information that is “reasonably likely to enable 
identification of an individual,” and it concerns “an individual’s 
 
 113. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 627 (1973). 
 114. PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 59, at 2.  
 115. § 332, 126 Stat. 73. 
 116. See § 332(a)(2)(B), (2)(E), and (2)(H). For instance, (2)(B) reads that the plan “shall contain, 
at a minimum, recommendations or projections on . . . the best methods to enhance the technologies and 
subsystems necessary to achieve the safe and routine operation of civil unmanned aircraft systems in the 
national airspace system . . . .” 
 117. See § 332, 126 Stat. 73. 
 118. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,191. 
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property that is not in plain view.”119 The bill requires any government 
entity using a drone to submit a data collection statement to the Attorney 
General, which provides numerous details, including the purpose of the 
mission, the drone’s data-collection capabilities, and the duration for 
which the data would be retained.120 Furthermore, no evidence collected 
by the operation of a public drone may be admitted “against an 
individual in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding.”121 The bill further 
provides that law enforcement may not use drones to collect or disclose 
covered information, except when that action is pursuant to a warrant or 
court order, is to monitor the border, is permitted by the prior written 
consent of the monitored individual, or is for an emergency such as a 
threat to national security.122 Any covered information collected in 
violation of those procedures may not be considered and must be 
expunged from the collecting agency’s databases.123 The Preserving 
Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013, narrower in 
scope, provides for similar restrictions against unwarranted drone 
monitoring.124  
The language of the Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act is 
perhaps the strongest of all proposed legislation. Proposed in March 
2015, the bill observes that drones have traditionally found almost 
exclusively military application, but are increasingly being used by 
“State and local governments . . . including deployments for law 
enforcement operations.”125 Acknowledging the beneficial applications, 
“from spotting wildfires to assessing natural disasters,”126 the bill 
submits that “there also is the potential for unmanned aircraft system 
technology to enable invasive and pervasive surveillance without 
adequate privacy protections, and currently, no explicit privacy 
protections or public transparency measures with respect to such system 
technology are built into the law.”127 Like the Preserving American 
Privacy Act, the Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act would 
require a data collection statement minimizing the intake of information 
and detailing the purposes, duration, and impact on privacy that the 
 
 119. Preserving American Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 1385, 114th Cong. § 3119a(2)(A) (1st Sess. 
2015). 
 120. Id. at § 3119b(c). 
 121. Id. at § 3119c(a).  
 122. Id. at § 3119c(b)-(c). 
 123. Id. at § 3119c(c)(6). 
 124. Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013, H.R. 972, 113th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2013). 
 125. Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015, S. 635, 114th Cong. § 2(2) (1st Sess. 
2015). 
 126. Id. at § 2(5), 
 127. Id. at § 2(6). 
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drone surveillance will have upon the monitored individual.128  
None of these bills have been enacted into law.129 In fact, they have 
had to be re-introduced, because their predecessors have died in 
previous Congresses.130 One author has argued that federal regulations 
on law enforcement’s use of drones could “provid[e] a floor for state 
laws.”131 The states would then be the principal legislators of drone law, 
citing federal bills that “propose warrant requirements for drone 
surveillance by law enforcement.”132  
III. DUE PROCESS AND JUDICIAL PROTECTION AGAINST PUBLIC ACTION 
Two lines of Supreme Court cases show when the Court is willing to 
extend due process protection: (1) when an individual presents a strong 
liberty interest against a weak or weakened government interest and (2) 
when the government has acted in a way that shocks the conscience.133 
The first analysis is frequently discharged in the judicial review of 
legislation which is allegedly unconstitutional.134 The second analysis 
usually involves executive or police action.135  
When a technological dynamic is significant to a case’s facts, the 
Court shows a willingness to defer to Congress as the best-situated body 
to protect privacy interests in the face of burgeoning technological 
advances. A rule-making body may listen to and reflect changing public 
feeling and delineate rules that “balance privacy and public safety in a 
comprehensive way.”136  
A. The Right to Privacy 
In their influential essay, The Right to Privacy, future-Justice Louis 
Brandeis and his classmate Samuel Warren chronicled the common 
law’s ability to adapt to societal changes and needs.137 The law’s 
 
 128. Id. at § 339(a)-(b). 
 129. See, e.g., S. 635 (114th): Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015, GOVTRACK,  
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s635 (last visited Feb. 2, 2017). 
 130. Id.  
 131. Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4 CAL. 
L. REV. CIRCUIT 57, 59 (2013). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 134. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 135. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998); Collins v. City of Harker 
Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115 (1992). 
 136. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 137. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
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capacity to expand, without the guidance of precedent or legislation, is 
limited; but as the essay’s epigraph suggests, when judicial doctrine 
does expand, it is a function of its sensitivity to “principles of private 
justice, moral fitness, and public convenience.”138 Significantly, the 
impetus of the article was the increasing prevalence of “the 
photographic art.”139 In 1888, George Eastman introduced the Kodak 
camera, which many amateur photographers used for its simplicity.140 
By 1890, Brandeis and Warren were proposing that tort doctrines could 
be expanded to protect people’s right to privacy with respect to 
burgeoning photographic technology.141 Describing past judicial 
groping, such as prosecuting the reading of private letters as a breach of 
contract, they conclude that common law evolutions protecting 
“personal appearance, sayings, acts, and . . . personal relations” flow 
from the right to privacy, or “rights as against the world.”142 The 
justification for judicially protecting individual privacy depends on the 
recognition that 
 
[t]he intense intellectual and emotional life, and the heightening of 
sensations which came with the advance of civilization, [make] it 
clear to men that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life 
lay in physical things. Thoughts, emotions, and sensations 
demanded legal recognition, and the beautiful capacity for growth 
which characterizes the common law enabled the judges to afford 
the requisite protection, without the interposition of the 
legislature.143 
 
Such doctrinal expansion is a dominant gene in the substantive due 
process bloodline.  In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas’s 
majority opinion relied on the penumbra of the Bill of Rights to protect 
the right to privacy for married couples to use contraceptives.144 The 
right, he argued, was protected because of what the Bill of Rights partly 
 
 138. Id. at 193 (quoting Millar v. Taylor (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, 2312). 
 139. Id. at 211. The authors refer to private action, largely journalistic, which invaded the lives of 
others. However, they do not limit to private action their principle of a right to privacy underlying 
common law evolutions meant to protect privacy, arguing that “the existing law affords a principle 
which may be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual from invasion . . . [by] the possessor of 
any other modern device for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds.” Id. at 206.  
 140. George Eastman, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/technology/Kodak-camera (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).  
 141. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 137, at 211. 
 142. Id. at  213. Judge Cooley preferred the right “to be let alone.” Id. at 195. 
 143. Id. at 195. 
 144. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
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shadows through implication.145 Justice Harlan’s concurrence disagreed, 
arguing that the proper constitutional touchstones were the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and its protection against violations 
of values “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”146 Though brief, 
the concurrence can be considered to have Justice Harlan’s seminal Poe 
v. Ullman dissent appended to it.147  
In Poe, Justice Harlan argued that a statute against the use of 
contraceptives by married couples was “an intolerable and unjustifiable 
invasion of privacy in the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an 
individual's personal life.”148 Justice Harlan recognized that legal codes 
cannot determine the content of due process; rather, the Court supplies 
its content—which is comprised of “history and purposes” rather than of 
words—by contemplating the living traditions which guide the Court 
into striking a balance between the liberty of the individual and an 
organized society’s demands.149  The continuum of protected liberties 
“includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and 
purposeless restraints . . . [recognizing] that certain interests require 
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their 
abridgment.”150 Though the Court has not defined “with exactness the 
liberty thus guaranteed . . . [w]ithout doubt, it denotes, not merely 
freedom from bodily restraint . . . .”151 In exegeting what lies within the 
boundaries of due process, a “new decision must take ‘its place in 
relation to what went before and further (cut) a channel for what is to 
come.’”152 Justice Harlan affirmed the characterization in Rochin v. 
California of due process as a narrow strip of judicial license enclosed 
all around with limits inherent in the judicial process.153 In short, he 
does not represent the enterprise of balancing limits with liberty as 
anything less than fastidious. Despite these constraints, Justice Harlan 
would have found that marital relations were too private for the State’s 
moralizing intrusion.154 
If the Poe dissent expressed the limits constraining due process, later 
 
 145. Id. at 484 (“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”). 
 146. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 
(1937)). 
 147. Id. (“For reasons stated at length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman . . . I believe that 
[the Connecticut statute] does [infringe the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment].)”.  
 148. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. at 542-43. 
 150. Id. at 543 (citations omitted). 
 151. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
 152. Id. at 544 (quoting Irvine v. People of California, 347 U.S. 128, 146 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting)). 
 153. Id. See Rochin discussion infra. 
 154. Id. at 555. 
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opinions confirmed the license animating due process.155 Roe v. Wade 
held that the right of privacy was sufficiently broad to include a 
woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy qualified by important state 
interests.156 A scrupulous review of prior cases showed that “only 
personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty’ are included in this guarantee of personal 
privacy.”157 Roe entered a crucible and emerged singed but intact in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.158 Drawing 
from the Poe dissent, Justice O’Connor’s opinion observed that 
adjudicating substantive due process claims called the Court “to exercise 
that same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: 
reasoned judgment.”159 Absent, however, is any reference to Palko’s 
language that liberty interests are fundamental when they are “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty,”160 which would later be adopted by 
the Washington v. Glucksberg majority in structuring substantive due 
process analysis going forward.161 Instead, Justice O’Connor employed 
a stare decisis analysis that identified two decisional lines that had 
ended with watershed cases, demonstrating appropriate justifications for 
departing from stare decisis.162 The Court thus found each case 
 
comprehensible as the Court's response to facts that the country 
could understand, or had come to understand already, but which 
the Court of an earlier day, as its own declarations disclosed, had 
not been able to perceive. As the decisions were thus 
comprehensible they were also defensible, not merely as the 
victories of one doctrinal school over another by dint of numbers 
(victories though they were), but as applications of constitutional 
principle to facts as they had not been seen by the Court before. In 
constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed 
circumstances may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part 
of the Nation could accept each decision to overrule a prior case as 
 
 155. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 763 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting 
“Justice Harlan's respect for the tradition of substantive due process review itself, and his 
acknowledgment of the Judiciary's obligation to carry it on.”). 
 156. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 157. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citation omitted). 
 158. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 159. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849. 
 160. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).  
 161. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).  
 162. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-64 . The cases were West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 
(1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of District of Columbia and signaling an end to 
Lochner v. New York) and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (repudiating Plessy v. 
Ferguson’s separate-but-equal rule). 
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a response to the Court's constitutional duty.163 
 
In this light, Roe had to be upheld.164 Society’s understanding of what 
Roe meant had not so changed that justified overruling it.165 
Washington v. Glucksberg demonstrates the difficulty that substantive 
due process claims face.166 It is in Glucksberg that the Court synthesizes 
a major analytical standard by which to measure substantive due process 
claims. Substantive due process protects fundamental rights and liberties 
that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”167 and 
“‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty 
nor justice would exist if they are sacrificed.’”168 Secondly, the 
fundamental liberty interest must be carefully described.169 The 
government may in no way infringe such an interest, but narrowly 
tailored infringements designed to advance a compelling government 
interest will be evaluated with strict scrutiny.170 The Court narrowly 
construed Casey’s existential and philosophical flourishes about 
defining one’s own ontological concepts as actually referring to 
“personal activities and decisions” that comport with the newly 
expressed (and narrow) standard.171 In addition to Casey, an observation 
further narrows the new standard: although personal autonomy is a 
common thread in many liberties protected by due process, this “does 
not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, 
intimate, and personal decisions are so protected, and Casey did not 
suggest otherwise.”172 Measured against this standard, the Washington 
statute prohibiting physician-assisted suicide did not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment.173 
Justice Rehnquist criticized Justice Souter’s suggested framework, 
 
 163. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863-64. 
 164. Id. at 901. “Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans to 
us and then to future generations . . . We accept our responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full 
meaning of the covenant in light of all of our precedents.” 
 165. Id. at 864. “Because neither the factual underpinnings of Roe 's central holding nor our 
understanding of it has changed (and because no other indication of weakened precedent has been 
shown), the Court could not pretend to be reexamining the prior law with any justification beyond a 
present doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the Court of 1973.” 
 166. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. 
 167. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
 168. Glucksberg, 521 U.S at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)). 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. at 727 (“By choosing this language, the Court's opinion in Casey described, in a general 
way and in light of our prior cases, those personal activities and decisions that this Court has identified 
as so deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally 
ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 172. Id. at 727-28 (citation omitted). 
 173. Id. at 735. 
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influenced by the Poe dissent, as forfeiting this “restrained 
methodology” and defenseless against the subjectivity attendant to 
substantive due process claims.174 Justice Souter, who joined Justice 
O’Connor’s Casey opinion, proposed a different substantive due process 
framework, which arguably has a germ in the emphasis in Rochin and 
Casey on the inevitability of using reasoned judgment to evaluate due 
process claims.175 Justice Souter would first require that the values the 
Court recognized be “truly deserving of constitutional stature.”176 This 
constraint echoes the Poe dissent’s warning against permitting one’s 
personal convictions to transgress the principles inherent in the judicial 
tradition.177 Passing this threshold, a due process claim is next weighed 
against the state’s interest; the Court balances the relative “dignities of 
the contending interests, and to this extent the judicial method is familiar 
to the common law.”178 When the “legislation's justifying principle, 
critically valued, is so far from being commensurate with the individual 
interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied . . . the statute must 
give way.”179 
Lawrence v. Texas adopted Justice Souter’s due process analysis in 
overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld a state law criminalizing 
sodomy, thus extending the right for homosexual relations between 
consenting adults.180 Though not explicit in its application, the majority 
opinion modeled Justice Souter’s guidance to first determine that the 
claimed right rose to a constitutional stature.181 From there, Justice 
Kennedy engaged in common law methodology as Justice Souter 
prescribed in Glucksberg, and similar to Justice O’Connor’s approach in 
Casey. Casey and Romer v. Evans had substantially eroded the shore on 
 
 174. Id. at 721-22. 
 175. Id. at 767-68 (Souter, J., concurring). See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (“The inescapable fact is that adjudication of 
substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that 
same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment.”); Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1952) (“To believe that this judicial exercise of judgment could be 
avoided by freezing ‘due process of law’ at some fixed stage of time or thought is to suggest that the 
most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function for inanimate machines and not for 
judges.”). 
 176. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 767 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 177. Id. (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 542). 
 178. Id. at 767. 
 179. Id. at 768. 
 180. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 181. Id. at 567 (“To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual 
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it 
to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse . . . . The statutes do seek to 
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the 
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”). 
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which Bowers had been built.182 Against this weakened precedent, the 
individual interest was great. The stigma of a criminal conviction 
jeopardizes the charged person’s dignity;183 one’s existence is derogated 
and destiny controlled when a state criminalizes private sexual 
conduct.184 Application of this framework, very different from 
Glucksberg, resulted in the overruling of Bowers.  
Thus, Lawrence is a sort of inverse of Casey, though the Court 
applied similar reasoning in both cases: after extensive consideration of 
the propriety and constitutionality of the right under review, the Court 
overturned one case depriving liberties in the former and upheld another 
case protecting liberties in the latter. Their similar methodologies both 
resulted in the protection of individual liberties when balanced against 
opposing government interests. 
Glucksberg’s continuing applicability is in question after Obergefell 
v. Hodges.185 Obergefell stated that Glucksberg’s insistence on careful 
description of the right claimed, “with central reference to specific 
historical practices,” was inconsistent with any inquiry concerning 
fundamental rights.186 Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent sharply criticized 
the majority for “jettison[ing]” Glucksberg.187 
B. Due Process Protection Against Executive Action 
Rochin v. California provides the foundation for evaluating due 
process protections of human dignity and constitutionally intolerable 
methods of police evidence-gathering.188 The story of Rochin begins 
with a man sitting on his bed with his wife when police entered the 
bedroom and demanded to know who owned the pills on the nightstand. 
Rochin grabbed the pills and swallowed them.189 The police wrestled 
him, but were unable to extract the pills. They handcuffed him and took 
him to a hospital, where they ordered a doctor to force an emetic 
through a tube into Rochin’s stomach, against his will. He vomited. The 
vomit contained two pills, which held morphine.190 These pills were 
used as evidence against him at trial, where he was convicted.191 
 
 182. Id. at 576. 
 183. Id. at 575. 
 184. Id. at 578. 
 185. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 186. Id. at 2602. 
 187. Id. at 2620-21 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“the majority’s position requires it to effectively 
overrule Glucksberg”). 
 188. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 189. Id. at 166.  
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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Although the conviction was affirmed on appeal, one judge found that 
the record revealed “a shocking series of violations of constitutional 
rights.”192 
 In an opinion written by Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the methods used to obtain the conviction violated 
due process.193 Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that the administration 
of criminal justice was largely entrusted to the States194 and a court’s 
application of due process ought not be wielded as a “destructive 
dogma” against States’ administration of criminal justice.195 However, 
though not specified in any authoritative formulation, due process 
guarantees “respect for those personal immunities . . . ‘so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental’196 or are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”197 
Regard for these requirements “inescapably imposes on this Court an 
exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings.”198  
Addressing the inexact contours of due process, the Court observed 
that “[i]n dealing not with the machinery of government but with human 
rights, the absence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of meaning, is 
not an unusual or even regrettable attribute of constitutional 
provisions.”199 The nature of this sort of judgment precluded “freezing 
‘due process of law’ at some fixed stage of time,” because the 
adjudication of constitutional rights was a task for judges and not 
“inanimate machines.”200 On the contrary, these were not episodic, ad 
hoc judgments, but judgments that required care in reconciling the  
“needs both of continuity and of change in a progressive society.”201 In a 
word, this judicial task required humility.202 
From this posture of judicial humility, the Court found that the 
government’s investigative conduct was “too close to the rack and the 
screw.”203 Invading the man’s privacy, struggling to open his mouth, and 
forcibly extracting the contents of his stomach shocked the 
 
 192. Id. at 167. 
 193. Id. at 174. 
 194. Id. at 168. 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at 169 (quoting Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
 197. Id. (quoting Palko v. State of Connecticut,  302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (citations omitted). 
 198. Id. (quoting Malinksi v. People of State of New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)). The 
object of review in the Malinksi line of cases is a state court conviction.  
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 171. 
 201. Id. at 172. 
 202. Justice Frankfurter treats, at some length, the expansion of due process rights as demanding 
“the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that one's own views are incontestable and 
alert tolerance toward views not shared.” Id. at 171. 
 203. Id. at 172. 
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conscience.204 The Court considered it well established that due process 
made requirements upon the investigative means used to produce 
legitimate evidence. Notably, the Court was reluctant to lay down a 
clear standard with which law enforcement must comply in obtaining 
convictions, other than those methods must not offend “a sense of 
justice.”205 However, figuring prominently in the Court’s reasoning were 
analogies between coerced confessions and the brutality showed by the 
police. “A sense of justice” was shocked when law enforcement coerced 
a confession, and so with brutal displays of power.206  
The Court narrowed its holding further, noting that its resolution of 
this matter did not impact State court cases dealing with “essentially 
different, even if related” matters that had arisen “through use of modern 
methods and devices for discovering wrongdoers . . . .”207 Clearly, the 
facts in Rochin were of principle importance and the distinguishing 
factors were the brutalizing force and offense to human dignity. 
“[H]ypothetical situations can be conjured up,” the opinion states, and 
incrementalism does not always flow along a logical path, but “the 
Constitution ‘is intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not 
to maintain theories.’”208  
Justice Black concurred, but criticized the majority for relying on 
“evanescent standards” and the “accordion-like qualities of this 
philosophy [which] must inevitably imperil all the individual liberty 
safeguards specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights.”209 
It is easy to see that the methods the police used to gather evidence 
invaded Rochin’s body to a conscience-shocking degree.210 An example 
of what is not shocking to the conscience is a city’s failure to train its 
employees. That was the issue in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 
which concluded that any breach by the city in securing a safe working 
environment is actionable under state tort law, not due process.211 Nor is 
 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 173 (“Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining, 
and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be 
brought about by methods that offend ‘a sense of justice.’”). 
 206. Id. “So here, to sanction the brutal conduct . . . would be to afford brutality the cloak of law.” 
Id. It has been elsewhere acknowledged that the due process protection on display in Rochin is provoked 
by an abuse of the defendant's person. See State v. Delisio, 2d Dist. Greene No. 91-CA-46, 1992 WL 
213451, at *7 (Sept. 3, 1992). 
 207. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174. 
 208. Id. (quoting Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904)).  
 209. Id. at 177 (Black, J., concurring). Both Justice Black’s and Justice Douglas’s separate 
concurrences reasoned that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination prohibited the 
police from admitting evidence obtained by forcing the defendant to vomit. 
 210. See id. at 174. 
 211. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992). 
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such neglect “arbitrary in a constitutional sense.”212 
Paul v. Davis held that police chiefs were not liable under Section 
1983 for circulating a shoplifter’s photograph to area merchants.213 The 
claimed constitutional protection was too different to more substantive 
privacy decisions “relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, and child rearing and education.”214 A sharp dissent 
criticized the majority for permitting law enforcers to “condemn 
innocent individuals as criminals and thereby brand them with one of 
the most stigmatizing and debilitating labels in our society.”215 Justice 
Brennan argued that the Court had gone against its own procedural due 
process precedent “recognized that the public branding of an individual 
implicates interests cognizable as either ‘liberty’ or ‘property,’ and held 
that such public condemnation cannot be accomplished without 
procedural safeguards designed to eliminate arbitrary or capricious 
executive action.”216  
Whalen v. Roe recognized a privacy interest in “avoiding disclosure 
on personal matters,” but did not find that this interest was violated by a 
statute providing for the recording of Schedule II drug prescriptions and 
the patients who received them.217 The statute was not arbitrary, because 
it confronted a problem as “an orderly and rational legislative 
decision.”218 
Finally, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, Justice Souter reiterated 
that the Court’s “touchstone of due process is protection of the 
individual against arbitrary action of government,”219 and clearly 
separated the arbitrariness analysis “whether it is legislation or a specific 
act of a governmental officer that is at issue.”220 Only truly egregious 
actions by a government official rise to the level of constitutional 
arbitrariness that was lacking in Collins.221 And here, Justice Souter 
pointed to Rochin as a continuing standard of this level of arbitrariness 
that permits the Court to step between a claimant and a wayward 
 
 212. Id. at 130. 
 213. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 714 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 216. Id. at 725 (citing Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969)). 
 217. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). See also Slayton v. Willingham, 726 F.2d 
631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff had stated a claim against police for circulating “highly 
sensitive, personal, and private” photographs of him, reasoning that lower court misapplied Paul by not 
considering Whalen’s recognition that a constitutional right to privacy inheres in “avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters”). 
 218. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597. 
 219. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)). 
 220. Id. at 846. 
 221. Id. 
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government official: “for half a century now we have spoken of the 
cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the 
conscience . . . In the intervening years we have repeatedly adhered to 
Rochin’s benchmark.”222 The Rochin line of cases thus serve as a 
weathervane in evaluating what sort of situations the Supreme Court is 
willing to employ the Due Process Clause as a bar to intrusive 
investigations by law enforcement.223 
IV. OBSTACLES TO JUDICIAL PROSCRIPTION OF GOVERNMENT DRONE 
SURVEILLANCE 
A. Test Cases 
As seen above, whatever drone model is employed – the hulking 
Predator, the agile ScanEagle, the furtive Black Hornet, or the 
ubiquitous quadcopter – an onboard camera enables the operator to 
observe private behavior. Surveillance by drones differs from 
surveillance through other media. The public anxiety toward overhead 
observation by physical and mechanical eyes has been on display in 
Compton, Dayton, Baltimore and rural North Dakota. A company based 
in Dayton, Ohio – Persistent Surveillance Systems (“PSS”) – developed 
a means of surveilling an entire city by installing a 192-megapixel aerial 
camera array to the bottom of an aircraft.224 Once aloft, the array takes 
one picture every second of the city below.225 Computers stabilize and 
patch the photographs together to capture a region as large as 25 square 
miles.226 Originally developed for the Pentagon for use in Afghanistan, 
CEO Ross McNutt made it possible to use these wide-area pictures to 
create a live-feed that recorded not just the outlay of an entire city, 
including cars and individuals, but also capture the passage of time.227 
He likens the surveillance system to a “‘live version of Google Earth’ 
complete with a rewind button.”228  
The poor resolution prevents the identification of individuals and 
 
 222. Id. at 846-47. 
 223. See also York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 456 (9th Cir. 1963) (plaintiff stated a § 1983 and due 
process claim when police arbitrarily intruded upon her privacy by taking unnecessary nude 
photographs of her). 
 224. Chris Stewart, Wide Net, Big Problems Cast By New Police Tools, DAYTON DAILY NEWS 
(March 28, 2015, 7:27 p.m.), http://www.mydaytondailynews.com/news/news/local-govt-politics/wide-
net-big-problems/nkgjp/.  
 225. Id. 
 226. Id.  
 227. Reel, supra note 11. 
 228. Stewart, supra note 224. 
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vehicle models.229 Instead, the photographs render individuals as pixels 
that an analyst can track by moving backwards or forwards in time 
through the series of photographs.230 When a roadside bomb would 
explode, analysts could isolate the location of the explosion, zoom in to 
where it was detonated, and scroll through the pictures backwards in 
time to the moment of the explosion – and then keep rewinding until 
they saw a pixel, representing a person or vehicle stopping at that 
location long enough to plant the bomb.231 From there, they could follow 
the suspects backwards and forwards in time, learning where they went 
next, where they lived, or where their network was based.232 Thus, 
instead of single individuals, McNutt’s technology identified whole 
networks of enemies.233 
The technology found a domestic market. In 2012, the Los Angeles 
County Sheriff’s Department employed PSS for a nine-day trial period 
over Compton.234 The police did not tell the city’s residents or the 
mayor.235 The aircraft, heavy with its camera array, flew in a continuous 
loop over Compton, transmitting images to the sheriff’s office.236 The 
surveillance was intentionally kept a secret. One police sergeant 
explained, “A lot of people do have a problem with the eye in the sky, 
the Big Brother . . . so in order to mitigate any of those kinds of 
complaints, we basically kept it pretty hush-hush.”237 When the people 
of Compton learned about the surveillance a year later, they angrily 
protested and demanded new policies that protected their privacy.238 
When PSS sought an opportunity to flex its muscles at its home base 
in Dayton, Ohio, the police were interested, but first held public 
hearings to gauge the community’s sentiment.239 The proposal was met 
with much opposition, particularly from the African-American 
community.240 The city leaders decided against hiring PSS.241  
The Baltimore Police Department did not inform the public when it 
 
 229. Reel, supra note 11. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Angel Jennings, et al., Sheriff’s secret air surveillance of Compton sparks outrage, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (April 23, 2014, 5:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-sheriffs-
surveillance-compton-outrage-20140423-story.html. 
 237. Id.  
 238. Reel, supra note 11. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id. 
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began using the technology.242 In February 2016, the shooting of two 
elderly siblings gave PSS the opportunity to find the suspect. The 
analysts examined the aerial photographs of the scene. They spent two 
hours tracking vehicles leaving the scene, until they learned that the 
suspect had fled on foot. The analysts returned to the moment of the 
shooting and observed a person appear to rush away after the shots were 
fired.243 Though the person only appeared as a pixelated dot, they 
tracked his movements forward in time until he entered a house. Later, a 
vehicle arrived at the house. Someone exited the house, entered the car, 
and traveled to a hospital. They tracked him as far as the emergency 
room entrance. But due to the earlier confusion, they were not tracking 
the person in real time. It seemed they had no way to find the person 
after he entered the hospital.244 
Then the police determined that the house the man entered was 
probably owned by the girlfriend of Carl Anthony Cooper, who had a 
criminal record. Additionally, in tracking the person’s movements, the 
analysts realized he had passed in front of a ground-level security 
camera, whose footage they retrieved. Comparison between the security 
footage and the Cooper’s mug shot yielded a “possible match.”245 The 
police later labeled Cooper as “Public Enemy #1,” posting his picture 
and the footage from the security camera, which did not reveal 
suspicious behavior.246 The public was confused at how the police had 
concluded Cooper was the man who had shot the elderly siblings. 
Eventually Cooper was arrested for attempted murder and assault. The 
police said nothing of the surveillance technology which gave them a 
basis for his arrest.247 
The ACLU has suggested that it is a matter of time before the limits 
of the current aircraft carrying the camera array will give way to 
drones,248 which are far less limited in practicality. There are functional 
and financial rationales for this. The ScanEagle, popular with law 
enforcement, can stay aloft for 20 hours at a time,249 whereas McNutt’s 
pilots can stay aloft for only six hours.250 Financially, the City of Dayton 
 
 242. Id. McNutt himself believes the surveillance technology is best used transparently. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Jay Stanley, Baltimore Police Secretly Running Aerial Mass-Surveillance in the Sky, 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 24, 2016, 11:30 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-
future/baltimore-police-secretly-running-aerial-mass-surveillance-eye-sky.  
 249. ScanEagle Snapshot, supra note 67. 
 250. PBS NEWSHOUR, (Apr. 26, 2014, 12:56 PM) http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/new-police-
surveillance-techniques-raise-privacy-concerns/. 
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(in addition to the residents’ privacy concerns) was reluctant to pay 
$120,000 “for such a short time in the air.”251 Purchase of an entire 
surveillance system starts at $1.5 million, or a city could pay $2,000 per 
hour.252 Local agencies may invest in their own drone surveillance 
systems or continue borrowing them from agencies with their own drone 
force. After all, interagency drone-sharing is already significantly 
occurring with Customs and Border Patrol through the Certificate of 
Authority process.253 
It was through an interagency drone loan that the Nelson County 
Sheriff’s Department in North Dakota arrested Rodney Brossart and his 
sons.254 In the dispute over his neighbor’s cows, Brossart grew 
increasingly angry and threatened to kill the police officers who came to 
intervene.255 A 16-hour standoff followed on the massive 3,000 acre 
property.256 The police called a nearby Air Force base and, very shortly 
thereafter, a Predator drone was airborne. The Predator tracked down 
Brossart’s exact location.257  
In the ensuing prosecution, the state argued that the drone was not in 
use when Brossart threatened to kill the police officers, and it was only 
deployed as a “last ditch effort to peacefully end the nearly daylong 
deadlock.”258 Brossart argued that the “guerilla-like police tactics” and 
lack of judicial warrant made the use of the drone illegal.259 In 2012, 
U.S. District Court Judge Joel Medd disagreed, concluding that “‘there 
was no improper use of an unmanned aerial vehicle’ and that the drone 
‘appears to have had no bearing on these charges being contested 
here.’”260 Two years later, a jury found Brossart guilty of terrorizing the 
police.261 
B. Litigating Due Process Claims Against Weighty State Interests 
Since Part 107 does not apply to government drones and meaningful 
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congressional statutes have not been passed, citizens may have to resort 
to the courts. The Certificate of Authority system likely increases the 
discretion the FAA has in permitting governmental agencies to use 
drones. The Freedom of Information of Act requests made public are 
categorized per the requesting body. Some files are enormous, 
containing many applications by agencies to use drones.262 
Whether the due process attack comes under a claimed right to 
privacy or an allegation of arbitrariness against a government official, 
difficulties will meet the claimant immediately. The state interests are 
significant. Preventing crime and protecting national security are 
inherent powers held by the government. The Supreme Court has 
protected this governmental power in its due process jurisprudence by 
proscribing primarily the most offensive government conduct. Taking a 
man to a hospital and forcing him to vomit offends a sense of justice and 
shocks any sense of decency.263 So does forcing a woman to submit to 
nude photographs while in police custody.264 Such conduct is 
appropriately proscribed. But even as it is proscribed, significant police 
latitude is preserved. If the action does not rise to the level that shocks 
the conscience or is “fatally arbitrary,”265 there is no violation of a 
person’s constitutional right to due process. So, circulating photographs 
of a shoplifter to area merchants266 and deliberate indifference to a 
suspect’s life in a police chase267 are not automatically arbitrary or 
conscience-shocking. 
County of Sacramento re-emphasized the principle that due process 
protects an individual from the government’s arbitrary exercise of 
power.268 In stark contrast to the fact scenarios in the Court’s shock-the-
conscience and arbitrary executive action jurisprudence, Brossart’s 
arrest falls far below this standard. He threatened to kill police who had 
been called to his property because he had refused to return cows that 
obviously belonged to his neighbor. Not only did Brossart threaten the 
police, but his three sons did as well.269 The police force in that case had 
to contend with four armed men on a 3,000-acre property with which the 
four men were very familiar. No matter the state of technology, Brossart 
did not have the right to evade the police on his land. Having given the 
police cause to pursue him, he surrendered the right to privacy on his 
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own property. Before drone technology, the police would have been able 
to come onto his property to arrest him. Drones make it easier for the 
government to enforce the rule of law, but an increase in law 
enforcement efficiency per se does not violate fundamental rights. The 
government is permitted to adopt new forms of technology in the 
fulfillment of its mission. 
Similarly, deployment of the PSS technology from a drone would not 
rise to the level of arbitrary government action. First, the photographs 
render individuals as anonymous pixels, impossible to identify as 
specific individuals. Although Cooper was roughly identified after he 
entered a certain house in Baltimore, his identity was established 
through other means, including uncontroversial street-level cameras. 
Second, society is generally comfortable with the exchange of a minimal 
amount of privacy for increased community protection. For instance, the 
PSS technicians were only tracking Cooper’s pixel because he had fled 
the crime scene after the shots were fired. The intersection of a violent 
crime and suspicious behavior was the impetus for tracking him. 
Fundamentally, this is nothing new to criminal justice.  
Even in situations less antagonistic than what Brossart provoked or 
what Cooper was involved in, Paul v. Davis makes it very difficult for 
any claim of right to prevail when there is a suspicion of criminal 
activity. However, Paul v. Davis needs to harmonize with the Court’s 
later rulings in Lawrence and Obergefell. This latter line of cases is 
arguably not out of reach from a claim like Brossart’s, or the people of 
Baltimore complaining of clandestine police surveillance. In Seegmiller 
v. LaVerkin City,270 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged County of 
Sacramento’s division of substantive due process analyses based on 
whether the challenged action is legislative or executive.271 Fatally 
arbitrary legislation differs from a fatally arbitrary specific act by a 
government official. However, 
 
[n]owhere in that opinion or elsewhere, however, did the Court 
establish an inflexible dichotomy. This makes good sense, for the 
distinction between legislative and executive action is ancillary to 
the real issue in substantive due process cases: whether the plaintiff 
suffered from governmental action that either (1) infringes upon a 
fundamental right, or (2) shocks the conscience.272 
  
If the difference is merely ancillary, government use of drones that 
infringes upon a fundamental right may trigger an analysis closer to 
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Obergefell than Glucksberg. The Obergefell opinion is nothing if not it 
does hinge on a fundamental right. Chief Justice Roberts’ prophesy that 
Glucksberg has been ejected may come to bear. 
Access to the fundamental right analysis, however, does not 
necessarily carry a claim against government use of drones very far. The 
right still must pass constitutional muster under Lawrence. The 
individual liberty interest against unnecessary observation is deserving 
of constitutional stature. But Lawrence’s balancing of interests ends 
unfavorably for a claimant seeking complete liberty from government 
surveillance, by drones or any other technology. We consent to our 
appearances being captured by security cameras and law enforcement 
every time we venture out of our homes. Road signs already notify us 
that our speed is monitored by aircraft. In the virtual realm, many treat 
the internet as a public space and expect little or no privacy with respect 
to their digital selves,273 an attitude which comports with reality. The 
transaction is a slight degree of privacy for potentially substantial 
increases in security and police efficiency.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Without overt  government intrusion in a person’s most private space, 
it is not likely that a court will grant broad due process protections to an 
individual complaining of the government’s use of drones, which is 
based in interests as weighty as national security and criminal control. 
American society is already under significant surveillance. As 
technology advances, state and federal congresses should embrace their 
legislative role in tailoring policies that protect individuals from 
overreaching government uses of drones. First, the Supreme Court has 
shown a willingness to uphold legislation providing for appropriate uses 
of and safeguards against the sort of technology whose abuse may result 
in substantial encroachments by the government into private life.274 
Second, there is a dearth of precedent supporting a due process right of 
privacy in protecting the populace from surveillance. Third, the federal 
Congress, and especially state legislatures, are keenly postured to tailor 
rules that clearly demarcate socially beneficial and appropriate 
government uses of drones from the undesirable applications that 
intrude into realms that ought to remain private.  
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